As I work with archival documents, I am becoming increasingly convinced that, throughout the entire pre-revolutionary history of the Ukrainian lands and Kharkiv, there was no year bloodier, more terrifying, or more tragic than 1915. In the second year of World War I, Ukrainians fighting in the armies of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires died in droves for foreign interests during the “Carpathian Operation” (January 7–April 20), the Siege of Przemyśl (September 1914–March 1915), and the “Görlitz Breakthrough” (May 2, 1915–June 15, 1915). Subsequently, from June 27 to September 14, a rapid offensive by German and Austrian forces began, followed by the retreat of the Imperial Army. In historical scholarship, this event is commonly referred to as the “Great Retreat.” Data on the human casualties of that summer and fall remain a subject of debate to this day. Soviet demographer Boris Tsesarevich Urlanis, Ph.D. in Economics, writes in his work *Wars and the Population of Europe* that in 1915, the Russian Empire lost an average of 207,000 people per month—killed, captured, and wounded; thus, over the five months of the “Great Retreat,” losses totaled 1.035 million people. Former General Nikolai Nikolaevich Golovin, in his works written during his years in exile, indicates that the army’s losses during this period exceeded 2 million people. Of course, no one has yet calculated the proportion of Ukrainians in this entire carnage. At the same time, not only the human losses but also the “Great Retreat” itself and the military operations of 1915 on the territory of modern-day Ukraine have been studied very little and still hold many secrets. Today we will discuss one episode from those days.
So, it is the summer of 1915. The Russian Empire’s army, suffering heavy losses, is retreating under fire. Fighting is already taking place on the territory of what is now the Rivne Oblast. The situation in Kyiv is becoming increasingly tense. In August, the headquarters of the armies of the Southwestern Front received reports that the Germans were sending agents and entire sabotage groups into the city, whose goal was not only to sow panic among the population but also to carry out acts of sabotage (such as blowing up bridges, warehouses, and so on). An emergency decision was made to evacuate from Kyiv and the areas located on the right bank of the Dnieper all prisoners of war, refugees, and foreign nationals without exception, as well as to register the entire population of the city.
And on August 18, the commander-in-chief of the armies of the Southwestern Front, GeneralAdjutant General Ivanov, wrote to the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General Yanushkevich, regarding the urgent need to evacuate the city of Kyiv and certain other locations on the right bank of the Dnieper. He also requested permission to begin the evacuation immediately and to use the Kursk and Kharkiv provinces to accommodate the armies and government agencies.
The telegram he sent that same day to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, was more detailed and well-reasoned. Its text perfectly illustrates the entire situation as it stood at that time.
The excessive depletion of the armies on the front compels me to bring this matter to the attention of YOUR IMPERIAL HIGHNESS and to report that the current situation imperatively requires that we make immediate preparations for the evacuation of Kyiv, which is not only of immense political and economic importance to the southwestern region, but also, thanks to its holy sites, ancient and magnificent churches, serves as a religious center for the entire nation: with the withdrawal of the armies and the loss of communication with the northwestern front via Sarny, we are losing the best and shortest route for mutual support, meanwhile, the armies entrusted to me, due to their small numbers, cannot be considered sufficient not only for active, independent operations but also for holding back the enemy’s advance—an enemy possessing powerful artillery and whose morale is high due to the success of its recent operations. I consider it necessary to proceed without delay with the evacuation of all educational institutions, scholarly societies of immense historical significance, archives, valuable vestments, and the treasures of churches and monasteries, as well as libraries and museums; all factories and plants, the arsenal—which is of extreme importance to the army—and the multi-million-unit supply, artillery, engineering, and medical depots must be gradually evacuated; finally, military district headquarters and numerous government agencies will be subject to relocation, for which premises must be prepared in a timely manner.
Ivanov went on to point out that, for the evacuation to be successful, it was necessary to immediately reintegrate the Kharkiv and Kursk provinces into the Kyiv Military District and the theater of war, and to remove from them the various institutions of the Moscow Military District stationed there. Furthermore, the district military headquarters and various administrative offices were to be immediately relocated to the city of Kharkiv. In addition to authorization for the evacuation of Kyiv and the expansion of the territories subject to martial law, the general requested that “at least 25 million be allocated for unforeseen expenses related to the evacuation…”
The next day, Nikolai Nikolayevich Yanushkevich—who had no military experience whatsoever, and about whom his contemporaries wrote in August 1915: “General Yanushkevich’s name is on everyone’s lips; everyone is criticizing him—both civilians and military personnel—and the Jewish population simply curses him…” sent a telegram to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Ivan Logginovich Goremykin, in which he urgently requested that the issue of the evacuation of Kyiv be brought up for immediate discussion at the next meeting of the Council of Ministers, and also points out that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief himself, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich, shares this view.
Over the next few days, these two generals did not waste any time either, continuing to emphasize to everyone the need for an evacuation. Following a meeting on August 24, the Council of Ministers presented its position to the emperor:
- Since the city of Kyiv is of extreme importance to the state, the decision to evacuate it can be made only as a last resort.
- At this point, there is no need for it whatsoever, and the idea that it is necessary is merely General Ivanov's personal opinion.
- The Council of Ministers considers it necessary, under the current circumstances, to immediately convene a Military Council chaired by the Emperor, at which a decision on the evacuation should be made.
- At the same time, although General Yanushkevich states that the high command never issued any orders for forced evacuation—and, on the contrary, prohibited any acts of violence—nevertheless, the Council of Ministers is receiving reports that the forced and illegal evacuation of the population from vast areas is continuing. These actions must be stopped.
And who knows how things would have turned out for our city and region if the decision to evacuate Kyiv had indeed been made. After all, Kharkiv—already overflowing with soldiers, the wounded, and refugees—was truly unprepared for such a turn of events. However, on August 28, in his telegram to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Emperor Nicholas II spoke on this matter quite sharply and categorically. While acknowledging that the evacuation of Kyiv was a matter of the utmost importance, and that the troops at the front were suffering defeat after defeat and were outnumbered by the enemy, he nevertheless pointed out:
— The direction toward Kyiv is important to the enemy, but secondary;
— The enemy is launching its main offensive against Petrograd;
— The necessary military forces will be deployed to defend Kyiv, and all measures will be taken to stop the enemy’s advance on the city.
However, in the tsar’s view, “One must always anticipate the possibility of an unfavorable outcome and develop strategies and measures to mitigate the consequences of such an outcome,” so the Council of Ministers was instructed, just in case, to begin drafting an evacuation plan for Kyiv. Incidentally, Nicholas II did not deem it appropriate to convene a special Military Council on this matter, and he placed the entire responsibility for the defense of Kyiv on General Ivanov’s shoulders. For its part, the Council of Ministers, at its meeting on September 2, acting in accordance with the emperor’s will, deemed it necessary to establish a special interdepartmental commission in the city, chaired by Nikolai Alexandrovich Khodorovich, commander of the Kyiv Military District.
Some of the preparatory work had been completed in advance, that is, in September. Naturally, to avoid causing panic among the population, all information regarding the work, the commission, and the development of the evacuation plan was kept strictly confidential; all documents were marked “not for public release.”
The commission’s first meeting, attended by 41 people, took place on October 9, and the last one on November 25. These meetings resulted in the creation of a comprehensive document titled “Draft Evacuation Plan for the City of Kyiv.” I see no point in summarizing it here; I will merely note that by that time, only the governors of three provinces had provided answers regarding how many evacuees their cities and towns could accommodate:
- Samara — up to 60,000 people;
- Kharkiv — 50,000;
- Yekaterinoslavskaya — 60,000.
The following items were to be removed:
- 160,000 employees of government and public institutions and organizations, along with their families.
- 40,000 workers at industrial enterprises of military significance and their families.
- 100,000 residents of Kyiv.
This project also specified, down to the smallest detail, three predefined scenarios (evacuation in 60, 40, and 25 days).
Fortunately, all these plans and preparations never made it past the drawing board. After all, in 1915, the Germans and Austrians did not reach Kyiv, despite all the fears and predictions. Perhaps General Ivanov was simply panicking and, as they say, “making a mountain out of a molehill.” Or perhaps it was because the troops were stopped at the cost of the lives of ordinary Ukrainian peasants who had been drafted into the war. Well, in any case, quite a few people were evacuated to Kharkiv in 1915, even without the institutions and residents of Kyiv. Although I’ve already written about that.
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